
Insider and Ousider Threat-Sensitive SQL Injection Vulnerability Analysis in PHP
Ettore Merlo; Dominic Letarte; Giuliano Antoniol
Summary:
In general, SQL-injection attacks rely on some weak validation of textual input used to build database queries. Maliciously crafted input may threaten the confidentiality and the security policies of Web sites relying on a database to store and retrieve information. Furthermore, insiders may introduce malicious code in a Web application, code that, when triggered by some specific input, for example, would violate security policies. This paper presents an original approach based on static analysis to automatically detect statements in PHP applications that may be vulnerable to SQL-injections triggered by either malicious input (outsider threats) or malicious code (insider threats). Original flow analysis equations, that propagate and combine security levels along an inter-procedural control flow graph (CFG), are presented. The computation of security levels presents linear execution time and memory complexity More
Insider and Ousider Threat-Sensitive SQL Injection Vulnerability Analysis in PHP
Ettore Merlo; Dominic Letarte; Giuliano Antoniol
Summary:

In general, SQL-injection attacks rely on some weak validation of textual input used to build database queries. Maliciously crafted input may threaten the confidentiality and the security policies of Web sites relying on a database to store and retrieve information. Furthermore, insiders may introduce malicious code in a Web application, code that, when triggered by some specific input, for example, would violate security policies.
This paper presents an original approach based on static analysis to automatically detect statements in PHP applications that may be vulnerable to SQL-injections triggered by either malicious input (outsider threats) or malicious code (insider threats). Original flow analysis equations, that propagate and combine security levels along an inter-procedural control flow graph (CFG), are presented. The computation of security levels presents linear execution time and memory complexity
Posted in analysis, code, inection, input, ip, malicious, queries, soap-apache-mysql, sophisticated applications, vulnerability | No Comments »
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setting
standards
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by
Jeff Stewart
SENCAW | AUTHOR
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Here’s a simple example of a script that sniffs an ethernet line for all TCP/IP packets bound to/from a particular host and dumps out the source/destination IP address/port and a hex dump of the packet’s contents:
I recommend checking out Net::Pcap, Net::PcapUtils, and the NetPacket CPAN
modules. Net::Pcap is an perl interface straight into libpcap (libpcap is a
packet sniffing library on which most UNIX sniffers are based; tcpdump is
written using libpcap). Net::PcapUtils is a more perl-like interface to
Net::Pcap that is a bit easier to use than raw Net::Pcap. The NetPacket
module provide parsing for a few (but the most common) layer 2, 3, and 4
protocols (ICMP, IP, TCP, UDP, ARP, Ethernet, etc…). With these tools you
can put together custom sniffer utilities very quickly.
Posted in ARP, Ethernet, ICMP, Net::Pcap, Net::PcapUtils, NetPacket CPANmemcache-server-hashes modules, UDP, UNIX sniffers, Uncategorized, ip, perl, tcp, tcpdump | No Comments »